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Abstract
Using information of the balance sheets of Spanish banks between 1995 and 2009, we 
estimate the average impact of current and anticipated changes in banks’ capital on fi rm 
lending. We isolate the role of credit supply factors using the variation in capital growth 
associated to the bank-specifi c historical exposure to real estate development –measured 
10 years before the outburst of the fi nancial crisis- and its interaction with the change 
in housing prices in the provinces where they operate. We further control for the quality 
of borrowers by using industry fi xed effects. Our main results suggest fi rstly that lagged 
exposure to real estate development and its interaction with prices explain banks’ capital 
growth and the overall doubtful loans ratio after 2008 – in turn, a determinant of anticipated 
changes in capital. And, secondly, that the deterioration of banks’ capital position has had a 
negative, although of a limited magnitude, effect on the supply of loans to non-construction 
fi rms. Our interpretation is that banks that have experienced capital shortfalls or banks that 
have increased their capital but without reaching the level that is demanded by fi nancial 
markets might have had no option but to reduce their lending. The relatively small magnitude 
of credit supply factors may be explained by the weakness of loan demand in a context of 
a deep recession.
Keywords: Bank lending, bank capital, loan supply, instrumental variables.
JEL classifi cation: E51, G21.
Resumen
Este trabajo utiliza información desagregada de los balances de las entidades bancarias 
españolas desde 1995 hasta 2009 para estimar el efecto del crecimiento del capital 
bancario sobre la evolución del crédito a empresas, distinguiéndose entre el efecto de 
cambios efectivos y  anticipados en el capital. Con el fi n de aislar el efecto de factores 
asociados a la oferta de crédito, se utilizan los cambios en el capital bancario que están 
vinculados a la exposición histórica de cada entidad al sector de promoción inmobiliaria 
(aproximada por el promedio de la exposición e el período 1995-1997) así como a su 
interacción con el precio de la vivienda en las provincias en las que operan las entidades 
bancarias. Con el fi n de acomodar la heterogeneidad en la solvencia de la demanda de 
crédito, se incluyen en las especifi caciones efectos fi jos de industria y año. Los resultados 
sugieren, en primer lugar, que las entidades tradicionalmente más expuestas al sector de 
promoción inmobiliaria experimentaron en 2009 un menor crecimiento de su capital y, 
después de 2008, un mayor crecimiento de la tasa de morosidad. En segundo lugar, estas 
entidades redujeron su oferta de crédito a sectores no relacionados con la construcción, si bien 
la magnitud de dicha reducción fue limitada. Los resultados sugieren que las entidades que 
experimentaron disminuciones en su capital —o que lo aumentaron en menor medida que 
lo exigido por los mercados fi nancieros— contrajeron su oferta de crédito, aunque de forma 
modesta. La pequeña magnitud del efecto puede deberse a la debilidad de la demanda de 
crédito durante la recesión.
Palabras claves: Crédito bancario, capital bancario, oferta de crédito, variables instrumentales.
Códigos JEL: E51, G21.
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1. Introduction 
The role of bank’s balance sheets in shaping the evolution of credit growth has been subject to 
debate during the 2008 recession. On one hand, there is evidence that exposition to “toxic” assets 
has affected some banks’ ability to lend (Puri et al., 2011). On the other, even in banking systems 
without structured off-balance products, but with a high exposition to real estate, drops in housing 
prices have deteriorated financial intermediaries’ capital positions and, possibly, the overall supply 
of credit. This paper analyzes the case of Spain, an economy that experienced a housing boom 
until 2007 and a drop of business lending in 2009 to gauge the impact of actual and anticipated 
changes in bank’s capital on business lending.  
The Spanish financial system was not severely hit by the first wave of the global financial crisis, as 
a result of a number of factors: the negligible presence of toxic assets in their balance sheet, the 
regulation that prevented the creation of off-balance sheet investment vehicles and the large 
weight of long-term instruments in their funding structure. However, as the initial financial turmoil 
changed into a deep recession, Spanish banks were increasingly affected as their high exposure to 
the real estate sector and the sharp increase in unemployment led to an important deterioration in 
the quality of their loan portfolios. The existence of provisioning buffers required by the demanding 
Spanish prudential regulatory system mitigated the impact on profits of the surge in doubtful loans. 
Nevertheless, the progressive reduction in these buffers as well as the increasing capital ratios 
considered as acceptable by regulators and markets have put additional pressure on banks’ 
capital what, in turn, might have constrained the credit supply, especially in the case of those 
institutions that took on more risks during the cyclical upturn1. 
Disentangling the specific contribution of bank capital from demand related factors is always a 
difficult task. In a time series context, in a recession there is a downward revision of spending plans 
and, consequently, of loan demand, while, at the same time, both bank capital and borrowers’ 
creditworthiness deteriorates, so stricter lending standards are applied by financial institutions. In a 
cross-section context, it is typically argued that banks and firms do not match randomly and it may 
be the case that firms whose demand for credit is more sensitive to recessions end up borrowing 
from the smallest and less capitalized banks. A strand of the literature uses aggregate data and 
identifies demand and supply effects out of the assessment of banks through bank lending surveys 
(Hempell and Kok-Sorensen, 2009) or instruments based on lagged capital (Berrospide and Edge, 
2010, Francis and Osborne, 2009)2. While results vary across studies, this methodology typically 
permits assessing the magnitude of the effects by running counterfactuals on the evolution of 
 

1 For a more detailed review of the recent developments of credit in the Spanish economy, see chapter 1 in Banco de 
España (2010). 
2The information provided by the answers to bank lending surveys, that are usually the only source of information explicitly 
distinguishing between demand and supply factors, although useful to better understand the recent behavior of credit and 
the banks’ prospects, is often insufficient to assess the relative contribution of both components, mainly because of its 
qualitative and subjective nature. 
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overall credit. Another strand of the literature uses firm-level data to cleanly identify bank specific 
balance sheet impacts by using the subsample of firms that continue borrowing from at least two 
banks during the period of analysis. By relating the growth of bank-specific lending to the same 
firm to bank characteristics, several authors find that banks’ liquidity or capital position do affect 
lending growth (Khwaja and Mian, 2008, Jimenez et al., 2010a, Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010, or 
Gan, 2007 provide excellent examples in Pakistan, Spain, Italy and Japan, respectively). While very 
elegant, identification of credit-supply effects in the latter case is silent about the role of the bank’s 
capital channel for the borrowing behavior of firms that end up relying on a single bank or of those 
that close down during a recession. The latter can be a non-trivial subgroup. For example, using 
the business demographics database compiled by the Spanish National Statistical Institute, the 
number of firms fell by 10% between 2008 and 2009. 
We provide evidence on the impact of changes in bank capital on business lending that 
complements both approaches by using bank-industry level data. Focusing on this type of data 
allows us to track the evolution of aggregate lending within an industry (including that granted to 
firms that close or firms relying on a single bank) while controlling for industry specific quality 
effects. Furthermore, Jimenez et al. (2010b) have recently documented that tests of the bank 
lending channel based on firm-level data may overstate the role of bank capital if firms are able to 
substitute lending across banks. Using industry level data and adapting their methods we can 
obtain insights about the prevalence of firm reshuffling. The price we pay for using bank-industry 
level data is that we need to show that our estimates do not confound supply with demand effects 
within industries. 
Our strategy is the following. Firstly, guided by a simple model of bank behavior according to 
which lending growth is conditioned by capital growth only when the level of capital is near the 
amount required either by the regulator or the funding markets, we study two different channels 
through which the capital position of a bank may affect its lending behavior (see Van den Heuvel, 
2001). The first one relates changes in lending to firms to current changes in the capital position 
of a bank. The second one is emphasized in the literature on banks’ lending under uncertainty 
and captures cuts in lending associated to anticipated future capital drops stemming from 
expected losses.  
Secondly, to identify the role of supply factors in the evolution of business lending, we use 
financial statements (balance-sheets and profit and loss accounts) reported by the Spanish 
deposit institutions to the supervisor between 1995 and 2009. As mentioned above, we 
construct a sample at the bank-industry level. We use an instrumental variable procedure as well 
as industry fixed effects to address the simultaneity between lending and capital. Our instrument 
is based on Watanabe (2007) and relies on the historical (as of 1995) exposure to real estate 
development. The underlying idea is that, unlike banks that enter in the real estate development 
industry during a real estate boom, banks with a traditionally high exposure to real estate 
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development are likely to better know the industry than the rest, but possibly due to relationship 
lending, they are more likely to be exposed to the ups and downs of real estate prices. That fact, 
combined with whether or not these banks operate in areas that experienced housing price 
declines, permits us to track the evolution of bank’s capital position for reasons weakly related to 
the quality of firms’ demand of loans as of 2007.  
Our findings can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we find that lagged exposure to real estate 
development and its interaction with local housing prices are good predictors of capital growth only 
in 2009, when housing prices had accumulated two years of negative growth at the national level. 
Secondly, we find that those same instruments predict changes in the overall doubtful loans ratio 
already in 2008. Given that industry level dummies may not fully account for the quality of the 
demand, we run a number of specification checks. We find that the exposure to real estate and its 
interaction with housing prices predicts the doubtful loans ratio only in the real estate development 
sector and for banks that operated in provinces where housing prices fell. Those findings suggest 
that banks exposed to real estate were not lending to “worse” quality firms. In addition, we also 
find that the instruments we use (exposure to real estate development and its interaction with local 
housing prices) are not correlated with deposit growth or proxies of the liquidity position of a bank, 
suggesting that we are indeed capturing a capital effect. 
Finally, we estimate Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) models of credit growth (both including and 
excluding construction related industries) on current and (proxies of) anticipated capital growth. We 
find a statistically significant role of actual and anticipated capital growth on business lending. The 
estimate is robust to changes in sample composition, estimation method or adjustments for the 
possibility that firms shift their debt portfolio when constrained banks cut their lending. 
Nevertheless, our back-of the envelope computations suggest a limited role for the capital channel 
during the sample period we consider (accounting for between 6 and 23 percent of the actual 
credit drop). Overall, our preferred estimates suggest that the deterioration of banks’ capital 
position has had a negative but limited effect on the supply of loans to firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief review of the recent 
literature that has analyzed the influence of a bank’s capital position on its lending provision. 
Section 3 describes the theoretical framework and our empirical strategy. Section 4 deals with 
some empirical issues. Specifically, it presents the procedure used to address the potential 
simultaneity of capital and lending and it describes the data sources and the variables included in 
the empirical specifications. Section 5 discusses the results obtained while section 6 provides 
some robustness checks. Finally, section 7 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Bank capital and lending growth: an overview of the empirical literature  
The detailed theoretical model linking bank capital and bank lending operates through capital 
regulation. This bank capital channel is explicitly modeled by Van den Heuvel (2001, 2002). 
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Assuming both an imperfect market for bank equity and risk-based capital requirements, he shows 
that when capital drops to a sufficiently low level, as a result of an increase in loan losses, the bank 
will reduce lending because of the capital requirement and the cost of issuing new equity. Capital 
does not necessarily need to fall below the capital requirement to trigger a reduction in lending, as 
the bank might prefer to forego some lending opportunities in order to reduce the risk of breaching 
the capital regulatory limit in the future. 
On the empirical side, the impact of bank capital on loan growth has been a highly researched area 
in specific episodes of credit slowdown. In particular, a number of papers explored the role of the 
introduction of new bank capital regulations (Basel I) in explaining the credit slowdown in the early 
1990s in the U.S. economy. These studies did not provide a conclusive answer on the potential 
existence of a bank-capital induced credit crunch. Bernanke and Lown (1991), using a cross-
section of y-o-y growth rates for 1991:Q1 found that actual capital-to-asset ratios had a significant 
effect on loan growth, although the relevance of this effect was significantly lower than that of 
economic activity3. Berger and Udell (1994) did not find a significant effect of alternative definitions 
of capital ratios on loan growth during the period 1990-1992. By contrast, Hancock and Wilcox 
(1993) found, for a sample of U.S. banks in 1990, that shortfalls in capital ratios (measured in 
relative terms to a target level) had a significant effect on loan growth. Using an alternative 
approach and a sample of banks in New England over the period 1989:Q2 to 1994:Q4, Peek and 
Rosengreen (1995) found that capital growth was the main determinant of lending growth for a 
sample of banks with low regulatory ratings (and hence presumably constrained) whereas it did not 
have a significant effect for the a priori unconstrained banks. Given the large number of banks with 
low regulatory ratings in New England in the early 1990s, these authors argue that capital 
constraints may had played an important role in the sluggish lending growth and weak economic 
activity at that time. Their estimates suggest that an increase in capital growth of 1 pp increased 
the supply of credit (among low regulatory ratings banks) by 5 pp, a very large effect. 
Several papers have analyzed whether or not the weakness of lending growth might be related to 
regulatory developments such as the adoption of Basel I in the early 1990s or the demand by the 
Japanese regulator of a more rigorous self-assessment of their assets, which led to a substantial 
amount of loan loss write-offs and provisions. Focusing on this later development, Woo (2003) and 
Watanabe (2007) found that Japanese banks significantly reduced their lending in response to a 
large loss on bank capital resulting from the reinforcement of the prudential policy guidelines by the 
Japanese regulator. Watanabe’s results suggest a very large role of the contraction of capital on 
business lending: had capital not been squeezed, business lending to non-troubled industries (that 
actually fell, depending on the industry, between 3 and 5 pp) would actually have increased. 

3 It has been often argued that the credit slowdown became stronger later in 1991, so Bernanke and Lown (1991) could not 
fully capture the potential credit crunch because of the period they analyzed. 
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The magnitude of the current financial crisis has renewed the interest on this literature. Some 
recent papers have shed some light on the relevance of the effect of bank capital on lending 
growth during the current crisis. However, their results are far from being conclusive, mostly 
because the crisis or, at least, its effects on bank balance-sheets are still underway. Using a 
sample of U.S. bank holding companies over the period 1992:Q1 to 2008:Q3, Berrospide and 
Edge (2010) find small effects of capital surpluses/shortfalls on lending. Larger effects are found 
by Francis and Osborne (2009) using a sample of U.K. banks over the period 1996:Q2 to 
2007:Q4 and a similar methodology to that in Berrospide and Edge (a panel regression of loan 
growth on the deviation of bank capital with respect to a target). Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) 
use highly detailed data on bank-firm relationships (compiled by the Credit Register of the Banca 
d’Italia) and find that those banks with poor capitalization displayed a higher contraction in bank 
lending over the period from September 2008 (just after the collapse of Lehman Brothers) to 
March 2009. In a paper similar in spirit to ours, Jimenez et al. (2010b) set the consequences of 
increasing securitization of credit to firms, explicitly taking into account for the possibility that 
firms substitute credit across banks. Once the possibility of substitution of loans across banks is 
taken into account, they find a negligible role for the credit supply channel. While their results 
mostly reflect the expansion that ended in 2007, we focus on the 2008-2009 period, and 
compare their findings to ours below. 
3. The link between capital and lending  
As the previous literature review shows, most of the empirical work on the role of supply factors 
to explain lending developments considers a reduced form relationship between loan growth and 
a capital ratio (or alternatively a measure of capital surplus, i.e. the difference between the 
observed and the desired capital ratios).4 By contrast, in theoretical models of corporate finance, 
decisions are usually modeled in terms of levels rather than in terms of ratios. Using a simple 
model of bank behavior, it is possible to derive a relationship between the growth rate of lending 
and the growth rate of capital.  
3.1. A simple model of bank behavior and the empirical specification 
To explore the role of capital constraints on lending growth we use a multiperiod stylized model of 
bank behavior based on Van den Heuvel (2001). Appendix 1 lays out this model in more detail. We 
assume that the bank holds only loans (ܮ௧), and has two types of liabilities, capital (ܭ௧) and deposits 
(ܦ௧). The bank faces an inelastic demand for deposits at a given rate ݎ஽ and chooses its level of 
capital and loans, while its yearly profits can be written as follows: 
ߨ௧ ൌ ሾܴሺܮ௧ሻܮ௧ െ ݎ஽ܦ௧] 
 

4 An important remark is that we consider as supply effects those stemming from weak capital positions. However, similar 
effects might arise from weak liquidity ratios.
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The capital of a bank evolves as follows: 
ܭ௧ ൌ ܭ௧ିଵ ൅ ሾሺͳ െ ߬ሻߨ௧ െ ݀௧ሿ 
That is, capital can only be augmented through retained profits: the difference between post tax 
profits  ሺͳ െ ߬ሻߨ௧ - where ߬ is the corporate tax- and dividends). The regulation typically requires 
banks to have a minimum level of capital: 
ܭ௧ ൒ ߛ௅ܮ௧ 
We assume that whenever capital falls below its regulatory minimum, banks are not allowed to 
extend new loans or to pay dividends. Hence, when the level of capital falls below the regulatory 
minimum banks might forego profitable opportunities. The problem of the bank is then to maximize 
the discounted stream of future dividends subject to the evolution of capital and to the capital 
regulatory constraint.5 
Van den Heuvel (2001) shows that in the solution of a model similar to that above, but with 
uncertainty about the cost of borrowing and about the future evolution of non-performing loans. In 
that case, banks accumulate a buffer of reserve capital on top of the legal requirement. The 
magnitude of such capital buffer depends on the distribution of expected losses ߠ and of the cost 
of deposits ݎ஽. In other words: 
ܭ௧ ൒ ሺߛோ ൅ ߛ௧௎ሻܮ௧ 
where the level of capital ܭ௧ includes both the amount required by the regulator (ߛோ) and an additional 
amount (ߛ௧௎) capturing anticipation of losses or capital requirements by financial markets. In the 
empirical application, we focus on the current share of non-performing loans (NPLs)6 as a main 
component of ߛ௧௎, in turn, a predictor of future losses and future negative additions to capital. In any 
case, when the capital constraint is binding (either for legal or precautionary motives) lending growth 
is equal to the growth of bank’s capital (see Appendix 1 for a derivation). 
ο݈݋݃ܮ௧ ൌ ο݈݋݃
ଵ
ఊೃାఊ೟ೆ
൅ ο݈݋݃ܭ௧        [1] 
By contrast, in the unconstrained case (i.e., those banks whose capital is strictly above the minimum), 
lending growth reflects the growth in the marginal benefit from lending relative to the marginal cost of 
funds. Neither of those magnitudes depends on capital growth. Hence, like in Peek and Rosengreen 
(1995), in a cross-section of banks, capital growth affects business lending only because current capital 
falls between the legal minimum and the desired level of capital for a fraction of banks.  

5 In the Spanish banking market, a set of institutions (savings banks) do not give dividends, as they are supposed to devote 
their returns to social enterprises. We assume still that they maximize the discounted “dividends” as a way of funding such 
enterprises. 
6 NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans that is defined as the share of loans that are considered unlikely to be fully or 
partially repaid on the contractually agreed terms, either due to customer arrears or for other reasons (if the institution has 
reasonable doubts regarding their recovery). Throughout the paper we use indistinctively the term doubtful loans ratio.
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Note that two related factors affect the credit supply of a constrained bank. The first is the direct 
impact of capital lossesο݈݋݃ܭ௧, as mentioned above. The second factor (the term captured by 
ο݈݋݃ ଵ
ఊೃାఊ೟ೆ
 ) reflects a cut in lending that is due either to an anticipation effect or to higher 
requirements by financial markets: banks anticipate future capital drops and thus target a lower 
ratio between business lending and capital. Distinguishing between both set of factors is important: 
by capturing expectations about future losses, the second factor identifies whether banks react to 
expected losses and, if that is the case, whether those predicted losses help predicting business 
lending in the medium term –even if banks comply with their regulatory minimum–.7 
3.2. Identification strategy  
We work with year-specific regressions of business lending growth on capital and dudosity growth 
between 2004 and 2009, using banks as unit of analysis (specifically, as we discuss below, the 
unit of analysis is the pair bank-industry). Namely, we implement a reduced form version of [1]: 
ο݈݋݃ܮ௧ ൌ ߚଵο݈݋݃ߛோ ൅ ߚଵο݈݋݃ߛ௎ ൅ ߚଶο݈݋݃ܭ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                          [2] 
Equation [2] is an average of the responses of capital-constrained banks (for whom ߚଵand ߚଶ are 
both equal to 1) and capital unconstrained banks (for which both coefficients are zero). We treat 
ο݈݋݃ߛோ as a constant. Next, we assume that ο݈݋݃ߛ௎ is a year-specific function of expected 
future losses and of the market’s perception of the situation of the bank (that in turn determines 
the cost of borrowing).  
ο݈݋݃ߛ௎ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅ ߜଵοܰܲܮ௧ ൅ ߜଶ
௄೟
௅ ௧
൅ ݑ௧                 [3] 
As opposed to pooled regressions, year-specific regressions have the advantage of allowing for 
unrestricted time-varying effects of each of the covariates of interest, allowing us to identify when 
changes in capital or dudosity are likely to have an effect on business lending.  
Cost of funding: This simple model abstracts from differences across banks in the cost of raising 
funds. Yet, heterogeneity in capital positions may affect the relationship between capital growth 
and loan growth. For example, if banks with higher capital are able to obtain lower financing rates 
in the funding markets, then capital growth would also be positively related with loan growth 
among unconstrained banks. Peek and Rosengreen (1995) incorporate such considerations and 
show that the response of loan growth to capital growth would still be larger among constrained 
banks. We include the 13-year lagged capital asset ratio and 13-year lagged asset size to control 
for those factors. While 13-year is arguably an extremely long lag for a capital, we argue below that 
by dating covariates well before the financial crisis, we circumvent the theoretical and empirical 
problem that arises because balance sheet and lending decisions are all simultaneously 

7 An alternative modeling of the relevance of the role of capital in the evolution of business lending is in Ehrmann et al (2003) 
or Peek and Rosengreen (1995). Nevertheless, these are static models that do not permit a discussion of the role of actual 
and anticipated capital losses. 
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determined. We also examine the evolution of liquidity and deposit growth during the financial crisis 
to determine whether differences in the availability of funding drive our results. 
Time variation in the profitability of loans In the Appendix we assume that ܴሺܮ௧ሻ is a decreasing, 
constant-over time function linking the interest rate charged on business loans to the amount of 
loans extended. Nevertheless, it is likely that ܴሺܮ௧ሻ varies over the business cycle. For example, 
during a downturn, all borrowers will be less likely to repay their debt. If the set of banks that we 
identify as potentially subject to capital constraints lend to customers that are specially likely to 
default, and their pricing decisions reflect such increased risk, the drop of business lending would 
not reflect a capital effect on lending, but movements along the marginal revenue curve that the 
bank faces. In other words, we would be attributing to a drop in banks’ capital what really is a 
movement of the demand for credit.8 In the empirical section, we examine the evolution of interest 
rates charged by banks 
Identification: To estimate the separate effects of capital growth and of changes in “precautionary” 
factors on loan growth, we use an instrumental variable procedure. The reason is that capital 
growth and loan growth are simultaneously determined. In an economic downturn we may observe 
a drop in loan demand quality (reflecting weaker activity) and a drop in capital (as a result of an 
increase in non-performing loans). A valid instrument must then be correlated with the growth of 
capital while uncorrelated with the quality of recent loans. 
The dynamics of capital accumulation suggests that any shock that changes non-performing loans 
is likely to affect capital growth. Given the exposition of the Spanish banking system to real estate 
development as of 2007 and the dependence of profits in that industry on housing prices, changes 
in the evolution of housing prices is likely to affect NPL and, subsequently, capital growth. Hence, 
we use lagged exposure to real estate development and its interaction with housing prices to 
identify movements in capital and dudosity growth. Below, we argue that the Spanish regulation 
allows us to identify each effect separately. Our identification strategy builds on the approach used 
by Watanabe (2007), who also examines the link between bank’s capital and loan growth in the 
aftermath of a housing boom. In particular, he explores the role of the capital position of Japanese 
banks to explain lending growth in the second half of the 1990s and uses an instrumental variable 
approach to overcome the endogeneity of capital. Watanabe uses the bank’s share of lending to 
the real estate industry in 1989 (and the change in this share over the period 1980-1989) as an 
instrument for the capital to asset ratio in the late nineties. The underlying rationale for this 
instrument is similar to ours: Japanese banks substantially expanded their lending to the real estate 
industry during the 1980s as a result of regulatory changes and those banks which showed a 
 

8 Imagine that the marginal curve faced by the bank is R(L)=a0-a1L. We assume that the “cost” of issuing loans is c1L –on 
top of funding issues. If during a recession, the c1 increases due to higher fraction of NPLs, even unconstrained banks will 
cut their lending and increase the interest rate on loans. While a general recession effect would be absorbed by a constant 
term, if the borrowers from banks subject to capital constraints (by our definition) are more prone to NPLs, we would 
erroneously identify a “capital effect”. 
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higher shift towards this sector experienced a sharper increase in their doubtful loans ratios and a 
deep weakening in their capital positions ten years later when housing prices started to fall and 
regulatory reforms required banks to accordingly revaluate unrealized losses.  
In our case, we instrument οܰܲܮ௧ and ο݈݋݃ܭ௧ using variation in bank’s industrial specialization 13 
years before the crisis. The weight of lending to real estate development on total business lending 
grew from 3% in 1995 to 30% in 2008 (see Figure 1). Our identifying hypothesis is that 
specialization in a sector creates persistence due to informational advantages. In our case banks 
that were more specialized in borrowing to real estate developers before the construction boom 
were in a better position to take advantage of the increasing demand of activity in that sector 
because of their expertise. Secondly, specialization in 1995-1997 is unlikely to be correlated with 
demand quality in industries other than construction in 2007. 
ο݈݋݃ܭ௧ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅ ߜଵܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ ൅ ߜଶܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ כ οܪܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ߜଷ כ οܪܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ݑ௧   [4] 
Admittedly some of the institutions that dramatically expanded their lending to the real estate 
development sector over the boom years were not highly exposed to this sector at the end of the 
past decade. In addition, among those that ended up with a high exposure to this sector there is 
considerable dispersion of doubtful assets ratios of this type of lending. Still, initial exposure to real 
estate development between 1995 and 1997 seems to be a significant predictor of exposure in 
2007. Figure 1 shows that those banks with a high exposure to this industry at the initial years of 
the boom ended up with a very high exposure when the slowdown started in 2007. 
Instrumenting doubtful loans:  
We instrument the share of doubtful loans using the fact that unlike other sectors, the profitability 
of the real estate development sector is closely linked to the evolution of housing prices, which 
have a strong national and regional component on top of the quality of the bank-specific particular 
loan portfolio. In particular, changes in regional housing prices are a likely driver of losses of banks 
that were initially exposed to real estate development. Thus, we use the interaction between the 
bank’s exposure to real estate developers at the beginning of the boom and the average change in 
the housing price in the years previous to the bust in the provinces where the bank operates 
(weighted by the number of branches in such provinces). As we control for regional fixed effects, 
such interaction captures the drop in loan profitability within a province that is due to a bank’s 
traditional exposure to real estate development. 
οܰܲܮ௧ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ ൅ ߛଶܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ כ οܪܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ߛଷοܪܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ݑଶ௧     [5] 
Separate identification of capital growth and the share of doubtful loans. Distinguishing between 
the contemporaneous effects of capital growth and of anticipated future losses on business 
lending is difficult. The driver of both developments, namely loan losses, is the same. 
Nevertheless, the regulation of Spanish banks creates a lag between the moment when losses 
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associated to non performing loans arise and the moment when those losses can result in 
capital losses. Namely, the Spanish legislation requires banks to set aside loan provisions in 
expansionary periods when typically the share of NPLs falls below an historical average. 
Conversely, in downturns, when the share of NPLs is high relative to historical averages, banks 
can draw from such ”forced saving”. As there is no need to fully provision losses in the moment 
when the expected loss occurs, increases in the doubtful loans ratio do not result immediately in 
lower profits and, hence, in lower capital growth. Therefore, using sharp increases in the share of 
NPLs like those observed in the period we analyze we can net out anticipatory and pure capital 
growth effects. We discuss threats to validity in Section 6. 
4. Data and empirical specification 
4.1. Data 
The data used in this paper come from the bank statements (balance-sheets, profit and loss 
accounts, and capital adequacy declarations) reported to the Banco de España by all commercial 
banks and savings banks between 1995 and 20099. Most of the information required is available 
with (at least) a quarterly frequency. However, the information on capital requirements is only 
available for the whole sample on a consolidated basis at a yearly frequency. 
We have excluded bank-quarter data when credit shares in the balance-sheet are below 10% in 
order to drop institutions that are not relevant for the purpose of this study10. We have also 
excluded two savings banks whose management was taken over by the supervisor and yet 
another institution for whom we lacked information on the historical exposure to real estate 
development. Most of the results reported in the paper have been obtained using a sample 
excluding branches and subsidiaries of foreign institutions. Our preferred sample of domestic 
commercial and saving banks contain 1369 bank-industry observations corresponding to 69 
banks that in 2009:12 accounted for 77.8% of total loans granted by deposit institutions, 82.5% of 
total deposits and 83.7% of total assets. In turn, those 69 banks belong to 55 groups that present 
consolidated balances yearly.  
The bank balance sheets contain the stock of outstanding lending to firms grouped in 23 different 
industries. For each of those industries, we also know the share of non-performing loans up to 
2009:Q3. Our main analysis takes as the sample unit the pair bank-industry. For example, a bank 
that has outstanding loans with firms in all 23 industries would contribute 23 cases to the sample. 
Organizing the sample this way, we are able to control for the industry specialization of banks. 
Provincial housing prices are obtained from the series elaborated between 2005:Q1 and 2008:Q4 
by the Housing Ministry (Ministerio de Vivienda). The data consists on assessments of the market 

9 That is, we focus on all deposit-money institutions excluding cooperative banks, whose share in the credit market have 
been around 5% over the sample period. 
10 Most of the institutions excluded as a result of this filter are subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks.
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value of a house made by private companies typically prior to a mortgage concession. The 
Ministerio constructs the series for the main city in each of the 50 Spanish provinces –excluding 
the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla located in the African continent–. We use the 
cumulative provincial housing price growth between 2005:Q1 and the last period prior to the year 
when we analyze lending behavior. Finally, we construct provincial unemployment rates using the 
2005:Q1-2009:Q4 waves of the Spanish Employment Survey (EPA, by its Spanish initials). 
4.2. Empirical specification 
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether or not a bank’s capital position affects its 
willingness to lend to healthy borrowers. Obviously, if an industry experienced a large shock 
leading to a sharp deterioration in the creditworthiness of the firms in that sector, all banks will likely 
cut their lending to that industry. However, only those that are weakly capitalized will probably 
reduce the volume of loans granted to sound industries. For this reason, our dependent variable is 
the growth rate of loans to non-financial companies measured at the industry level. 
As a proxy for the capital position we use Tier 1 capital (which mainly includes capital, disclosed 
reserves, preference shares and nonvoting equity units, less goodwill).  
In line with the discussion in section 3, we estimate the separate impact on business lending 
growth of two different variables: the change in capital and the change in the doubtful loans ratio. 
The specification is given by the following system of equations: 
ο݈݋݃ܮ௜ǡ௧
௃ ൌ ߚଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵοܰܲܮ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶο݈݋݃ܭ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚସοܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲǡ௧ 
൅σ ߛ௥ܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௥ܻ௥ ൅ σ ௦ߴܴܧܩܫܱ ௦ܰ௦ ൅ σ ߠ௩ܻܶܲܧ௩௩ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧
௃     [6] 
 
ο݈݋݃ܭ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵሺܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ሻ௜ ൅ ߙଶሺܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ሻ௜οܪܴܲܫܥܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߙଷοܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲǡ௧ 
൅ߙସοܪܴܲܫܥܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ σ ௦ߴܴܧܩܫܱ ௦ܰ௦ ൅ σ ߠ௩ܻܶܲܧ௩௩ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧ଵ     [6a] 
 
οܰܲܮ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅ ߜଵሺܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ሻ௜ ൅ ߜଶሺܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ሻ௜οܪܴܲܫܥܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߜଷοܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲǡ௧ 
൅ߜସοܪܴܲܫܥܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ σ ௦ߴܴܧܩܫܱ ௦ܰ௦ ൅ σ ߠ௩ܻܶܲܧ௩௩ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧ଶ     [6b] 
where ܮ௜ǡ௧
௃  is the amount of loans granted by bank i to industry j at time t, ܭ௜ǡ௧ is the volume of Tier 
1 capital of bank i at time t, οܰܲܮ  is the change in the doubtful loans ratio, οܷܰܧܯܲ is the 
change in unemployment, and INDUSTRY, REGION and TYPE are dummy variables indicating 
industry, region and type of institution. ܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ is the bank-specific share of lending to real 
estate development between 1995 and 1997, constructed taking into account all mergers and 
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acquisitions the bank undertook during the last 11 years. As mentioned above, we also include as 
additional controls the average bank size as of 1995-1997, the 13-year lagged capital asset ratio 
as well as the dudosity level as of 1998.11 
The coefficients of interest areߚଵ andߚଶ. The first coefficient isolates cuts in lending due to the 
anticipation of future capital drops. The second coefficient measures how changes in the capital 
position of a bank affect its lending to a particular industry relative to banks whose capital grows 
less. As discussed above, we aim to isolate drops in bank capital that are unrelated to current 
industry-specific demand conditions. As mentioned above, ߚଶ is unlikely to capture the relationship 
between capital and lending among heavily exposed banks that entered the real development 
sector after 1997. While such “latecomers” may have suffered heavy losses and cut their lending 
between 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q4, it can also be argued that those banks were picking up the worst 
quality borrowers. 
Controls related to the demand for loans. We also introduce additional covariates to control for 
demand quality. First, we introduce 22 industry dummies (the omitted category is “trade”) that 
absorb any factor that affected the quality of the industry during the 2008-2009 period. By 
including industry dummies, ߚଵ andߚଶ are identified by comparing differences in lending growth to 
the same industry by banks with different capital growth (or a different variation in the share of 
doubtful loans). By focusing on industry-level growth for a given bank, we also control for the fact 
that banks specialize in industries that behave differently over the business cycle. Now, while our 
approach can take care of differential quality across industries, it cannot control for differences in 
loan quality across banks within a given industry. In other words, if banks differentially exposed to 
real estate development lend to firms whose demand is especially sensitive to the business cycle, 
the industry fixed effect strategy would attribute to loan supply factors what really is a demand 
factor. To control for such possibility, Section 6.1. examines the correlation between exposure to 
real estate development and the share of non-performing loans within each of the 23 industries we 
observe in our sample. An alternative approach to control nonparametrically for the quality of 
borrowers is to include firm specific dummies in the model (see Khwaja and Mian, 200, Gan, 
2007, Jimenez et al., 2010a, among others). Unfortunately, and as mentioned above, that strategy 
is not suitable for our purposes. A specification that includes firm fixed-effects identifies ߚଵߚଶǤ 
using the sample of firms that borrow from at least two different banks and stay in the sample 
during the sample period. The first selection criterion is always debatable, as firms borrowing from 
only one bank may be very different from the rest. The second assumption excludes firms that 
close down, a contentious restriction between 2008 and 2010 when the stock of firms with at least 
one employee fell down by 10% according to the Spanish National Statistics Institute. If the 
subsample of firms that close down were especially responsive to limitations in credit supply an 
approach based on fixed effects could underestimate the true impact of credit supply conditions 

11 1998 is the first year when a measure of Non-Performing Loans comparable to the current one is available. 
and 
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on business lending. By using aggregate data within the industry, we are sure that we are picking 
up such margin of adjustment. 
Secondly, we introduce 9 regional dummies (excluded category: Madrid) based on the region 
where the bank had most of its branches as of 2006:Q3. Such dummies absorb region-specific 
trends that may affect lending during the sample period. 
Bank-specific controls. The summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that institutions involved in real 
estate development during 1995-1997 have somewhat different characteristics. On one hand, 
these are more likely to be savings banks. Hence, we control for institution type. On the other 
hand, they seem to have slightly higher capital asset ratios and a higher share of doubtful loans. To 
be sure that we are not capturing an effect related to a specific type of institution, we examine if 
our estimates vary when we include bank specific variables measured between 1995 and 1997, 
the period when initial exposure to real estate development is determined. In particular, the model 
in the Appendix gives us some clues about relevant differences in bank characteristics. A higher 
discount rate results in a lower level of capital-asset ratio (and higher dividends). As not all 
institutions pay dividends, we proxy for differences in the discount rate by using the bank-specific 
Tier 1 average capital asset ratio in 1995:Q1-1997:Q4.12 We also include the average total asset 
size during the same period as well as the share of non-performing loans to control for differences 
in attitudes toward risky industries (see  Kashyap and Stein, 2002 for evidence of differences in 
lending across banks as a response to monetary policy). 
Equation [6] is estimated both by (unweighted) OLS and TSLS for the cross-section of banks in the 
fourth quarter of 2009. As discussed in section 4.1, in the first stage of the TSLS procedure the 
growth rate of capital and the growth in NPL are regressed on each bank’s historical exposure to 
the real estate development sector (measured by the average of this exposure over the period 
1995-1997) using the 55 groups that present consolidated balances yearly. The capital loss is then 
imputed to each of the 69 banks that enter the TSLS regression.  
5. Results 
5.1. The first stage for capital growth: historical exposition to real estate 
development 
Table 2 displays the estimates of OLS regressions of the model for the growth rate of Tier 1 capital 
between 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q4. This specification uses the sample of 55 consolidated groups. All 
specifications include regional dummies and the standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. The estimate for the coefficient of the bank’s historical exposure to the real 
estate sector is -1.042 and implies that banks that were 10% more exposed to real estate 

12 Several authors control for measures of tightness of bank’s capital in the evolution of business lending by using deviations 
from bank’s capital from some long-run average (see Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004, Watanabe 2007 and others). We 
chose not to, for various reasons. Firstly, capital asset ratio exhibited a trend during the sample period, so a long run 
average would be a bit arbitrary. Second, the inclusion of a term proxying for expected losses partially captures such 
effects. 
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development in 1995-1997 experienced a 10.4% lower growth of Tier 1 capital between 2008:Q4 
and 2009:Q4. The result is robust to including a control for the change in the unemployment rate13. 
The F-statistic of the estimate is around 8, suggesting a reasonable quality of the instrument. 
Interestingly, when we run the specification in the first column in Table 2 for each year in the 2004-
2009 period, the results change significantly. Figure 2 displays the coefficient of the historical 
exposure to real estate obtained in an OLS estimation of a specification identical to that reported in 
column 1 of table 2 but for alternative years as well as 95 percent confidence bands. The 
coefficient of historical exposure to real estate development is basically zero for every year between 
2004 and 2008 but it turns out to be negative and statistically different from zero only in 2009. 
Therefore, the exposition to real estate development between 1995 and 1997 appears to be an 
adequate instrument for banks’ capital growth between 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q4.  
We have also estimated the first stage using as an instrument for each bank’s capital growth not 
only each bank’s historical exposure to the real estate sector but also the interaction of this 
variable with a measure at the bank level of the change in the housing price between 2006:Q1 and 
2008:Q414. Columns 2 to 4 of Table 2 display the estimates of this alternative approach, using 
different sets of control variables. The rationale for using that interaction is that the historical 
exposure to real estate might anticipate a weakening of the banks’ capital growth during the 
current financial crisis that might be sharper in the case of those banks operating in areas where 
the decline in housing prices has been larger. While the effect is large and of the expected sign, 
once we control for bank-specific characteristics (columns 3 and 4), the interaction of real estate 
development and average provincial housing prices does not affect capital growth. A possible 
explanation is based on the timing of price drops. As we mentioned above, the legislation about 
loan provisioning in Spain make it unlikely that capital growth is likely to reflect relatively recent 
losses, so the evolution of housing prices up to 2008:Q4 may not affect capital growth in 2009:Q4. 
Figure 3 displays the coefficient of the historical exposure to real estate obtained in an OLS 
estimation of an equation linking the lending growth to the historical exposure to real estate. It is 
noteworthy that this coefficient is also significantly related to lending growth only in 2009 whereas 
the effect is almost negligible for the remaining years. 
5.2. The first stage for NPL ratios: historical exposure to real estate interacted with 
local housing prices 
As mentioned in Section 2, the ratio of doubtful loans anticipates the evolution of capital through its 
impact on profits. We start by examining if the NPL ratio in 2009:Q4 is explained by the bank’s 

13 This result is also robust to the presence of branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the sample. Nevertheless, in 
this latter case the size of the coefficient of the historical exposure is almost halved, suggesting that the effect of real estate 
specialization on the growth rate of capital is significantly lower for these types of institutions. 
14 As in the case of the change in unemployment, the change in housing prices for each bank is the weighted average of 
the growth rate of housing prices over the period 2004-2008 in the provinces where the bank is present, weighted by the 
number of branches in each province in December 2006. 
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historical exposure to real estate development as well as its interaction with the average cumulative 
change (between 2005:Q1 and 2008:Q4) of the price of housing.  
The estimate of the impact of exposure to real estate in 1995-1997 on the growth of the NPL ratio 
is shown in Column 1 in Table 3 (panel A), and suggests a modest positive effect –an increase 
from the median of zero to the 75 centile of 3 percent increases growth of the NPL ratio in 2009 by 
0.33 percentage points-. When we include an interaction of past specialization in real estate 
development with cumulative housing price growth (column 2 in Table 3), the OLS coefficient of 
historical exposure is positive and the interaction with cumulative price growth is negative. Banks 
with an exposition of 3% to real estate development in 1995 experienced growth in their NPL ratio 
by about 0.8 percentage points. Therefore, the exposure to real estate has a positive influence on 
the doubtful loans ratio that is mitigated by positive growth rates in housing prices where the bank 
operates. More precisely, the effect of exposure on the growth of the NPL ratio becomes negative 
for banks settled in provinces where the average growth rate of housing prices between 2005:Q1 
and 2008:Q4 exceeds 20%. The results are rather stable when we add further controls for the 
capital asset ratio in 1995 (column 3), the NPL ratio in 1998 (column 4) or when we weight 
estimates by asset size in 1995 (column 5). 
Panel B runs basically the same regression as in Panel A but the dependent variable is now the 
growth in the NPL ratio in 2008. Cumulative housing price growth refers now to the period 
between 2005:Q1 and 2007:Q4. In 2007:Q4 housing prices started to fall, so according to our 
conjecture that housing prices were driving the evolution of capital and growth in the NPL ratio, we 
should see a link between the instruments and those variables already in that year. The estimates 
have the same sign as in 2009:Q4 but are weaker in magnitude.  
To get additional insight on the timing of losses associated to bank lending to real estate, Figure 4 
shows OLS estimates of the response of the share of doubtful loans to our measure of the 
relevance of credit supply factors during the period 2004-2009. We evaluate the response of 
doubtful loans to exposure evaluating the price change between 2005:Q1 and 2008:Q4 at the 10th 
centile of the distribution of housing prices.  
We note two results in Figure 4. Firstly exposition to real estate development and its interaction 
with housing prices was not a significant determinant of bank-specific growth in the NPL ratio 
between 2005 and 2007, periods when national housing prices were increasing. Only in 2008, 
when housing prices started to fall, the share of doubtful loans started to increase among banks 
initially exposed to real estate development. The response was highest among banks operating in 
provinces with lower housing price increases. 
Secondly, we find a significant impact of exposure to real estate interacted with housing prices 
already during 2008. Interestingly, among banks exposed to real estate development, increases in 
loans default ratios actually precede capital losses (for which Figure 2 only finds evidence in 2009). 
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This is what one should expect, as due to regulatory reasons it takes time that expected losses 
result in relative capital drops. 
5.3. Capital growth and business lending growth 
Table 4 reports the estimates of equation [6] both by OLS and TSLS. In the TSLS specification, we 
instrument capital growth using historical exposure to real estate development and growth of the 
NPL ratio with the same variable and its interaction with changes in provincial housing prices15. The 
evidence in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that both instruments have predictive power. 
The coefficient of capital growth in the OLS regression (column 1) is 0.005, statistically not different 
from zero and rather small. In Column 2, we show the TSLS estimated impact on business lending 
growth of capital growth, and the estimate is much larger, 0.71 (standard error: 0.23). By contrast, 
according to the discussion in section 4.1, we could expect that the coefficient of capital growth in 
the OLS regression was larger than the corresponding one in the TSLS. The usual argument in the 
literature for this positive bias in the OLS coefficient is of a cyclical nature: that is, in a recessionary 
period, both lending and capital tend to contract (or, at least, to experience a reduction in their 
growth rates). In a cross-section estimate, the idea would be that those banks who lend to firms 
that are affected most by downturns in the business cycle experience drops in capital and cut their 
lending because their customers are of worse quality in a recession. An explanation for the 
negative bias in the OLS coefficient that we obtain is that in the 2008-2009 period there has been 
a generalized increase –although of a different magnitude across banks- in the banks’ capital 
ratios, as a result of the higher demand by the financial markets and the expectations of more strict 
regulatory capital requirements, that might have altered the cross-sectional relationship between 
changes in capital and lending.16 For example, markets have likely required higher capital increases 
for banks with worse business prospects. Both factors bias the relationship between lending 
growth and capital growth toward zero. Note also that the increase in capital by some institutions 
(mainly through profits retention) might have not been enough to meet markets’ requirements.  
The estimated elasticity of lending to capital is 0.71 for the whole sample of industries, and the 
result is not changed much when we include a set of industry dummies to take into account that 
banks may specialize in different industries, some of which may be more riskier than other ones 
(column 3). The coefficient does not change much either when we control for other pre-
determined bank characteristics, such as asset size in 1995-1997 or the average capital-asset 
ratio in the same period (column 4) or when we control for lagged dudosity (column 5). Finally, 
our estimates do not change estimates substantially when excluding construction-related 
industries (columns 6 to 8). 

15 We consider for this second stage the results of the first stage corresponding to the most parsimonious set of 
instruments. Nevertheless, results do not qualitatively change when using also the interaction between the exposure to real 
estate and the change in housing prices as an instrument for capital growth. 
16 For instance, the overall solvency ratio for the Spanish deposit institutions has risen from 11.3 in December 2008 to 12.2 
one year later.
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Our estimates are substantially lower than the value of 3.84 reported in Peek and Rosengreen 
(1995) for their whole sample of banks. These authors split their sample between constrained and 
unconstrained banks (on the basis of regulatory ratings) and find that this elasticity is, respectively, 
5.71 and 0.48, being non-significant in the latter case. Part of the discrepancy between our results 
and those of Peek and Rosengreen stems from the fact that we are controlling for unexpected 
losses by including the growth of the NPL ratio in the loan supply equation. When we fail to do so, 
the impact of capital growth on business lending increases to about 1.00 (standard error: 0.33). 
That result highlights the relevance of controlling for expected future drops in capital. 
Doubtful loans and growth of business credit 
Table 4 also displays the response of business lending growth to the yearly growth in the doubtful 
loans ratio, holding capital growth constant. As mentioned above, the OLS relationship between 
credit growth and growth in the NPL ratio can be affected by either evergreening or specialization 
in “worse” customers. By using 10-year lagged industry exposure, biases due to specialization in 
“worse” customers are mitigated. It can still be argued that banks specialized in real estate lend to 
a different set of firms. For example, Jimenez et al. (2010) provide some evidence that banks 
generally involved in financing construction activities tend to have a different set of customers: 
smaller firms with more collateral. In section 6.1, we explore whether, within a given industry, 
banks more exposed to real estate development are more likely to lend to worse firms. 
 We find a positive and significant coefficient for the doubtful loans ratio in the OLS regressions. 
(see Table 4, column 1). However, once we exploit variation in the NPL ratio associated to 
historical exposure to real estate development, the growth of the NPL ratio has a negative 
coefficient, although it is not significant. The results for both samples (all industries and excluding 
construction and real estate) are again very similar.  
5.4. The magnitude of the estimates 
In order to obtain a first tentative estimate of the impact of banks’ capital restrictions on lending 
growth we adopt an indirect approach. As we have already discussed, most banks have increased 
their capital in 2009. In spite of this fact, it is likely the case that some banks might have a volume 
of capital below its target level because of the increase in the amount demanded by either the 
markets or the expected raise in regulatory requirements. To evaluate the magnitude of the 
channel we are interested in, we assume that those banks with a capital ratio below an arbitrary 
level have experienced a capital contraction that is equivalent to the gap between the level of 
capital and the implicit level of capital that would be consistent with the level of banks’ assets and 
the arbitrary level of the capital ratio. Taking 7% as the benchmark level of Tier 1 capital ratio and 
using the estimated coefficient in column 1 of Table 3, the implied effect on lending growth 
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amounts to -0.16 pp17, while the average growth of business lending in 2009 for the banks in the 
sample was -3.93%. Thus, this channel would explain around 6% of the total contraction in loan 
supply in 2009. Taking 8% as the benchmark capital ratio the implied effect on lending growth 
would be -1.08 pp (around 27% of the drop in business lending growth). 
Growth in the NPL ratio: 
To evaluate the magnitude of the effect of the growth of the NPL ratio on business lending growth 
in 2009 we run the following counterfactual: what would have been the growth in business lending 
had the doubtful loans ratio evolved not as it did, but as predicted by the model in column 2 of 
Table 3 but with cumulative growth in housing prices in 2008:Q4 staying at the 2007:Q4 level. We 
first compute the growth in the doubtful loan ratio that would have been observed if the housing 
price had remained at the 2007:Q4 level. That level was 1.22%, while the actual one was 1.55%. 
Then we used this counterfactual doubtful loans ratio to estimate what would had been the growth 
rate of lending in the alternative scenario of no yearly housing price change in 2008. We find that 
even with constant housing prices, the average growth rate of lending would have been -3,3%, 
while the average growth of business lending in 2009 for the banks in the sample was -3.9%. 
Thus, this channel would explain around 10% of the total contraction in loan supply in 2009. 
Rerunning the specification excluding lending to industries related to construction, we obtain that 
business lending dropped by 2.6 pp, while the counterfactual with no price drop amounts to a 
2.00 pp reduction. In that case, loan supply factors would contribute up to 18% of the observed 
drop in credit.  
6. Robustness checks and other outcomes of interest 
 
6.1. Unobserved quality: NPL ratios by industry 
The estimated impact of capital growth and changes in the NPL ratio on business lending may 
capture factors other than actual or anticipated capital drops if banks specialized in the real estate 
development sector lend to firms that, within a given industry, are more sensitive to changes in the 
economic situation. Such result would arise if for example, real estate development banks lend to 
smaller firms, or are more likely to grant loans tied to the value of housing collateral. We assess 
such possibility using as a measure of borrower’s quality the share of doubtful loans within an 
industry. If banks historically exposed to real estate development lend to firms that are more likely 
to default in the event of housing price drops, they should have a higher share of doubtful loans for 
all industries. Alternatively, if borrower’s quality is similar for banks exposed to real estate and the 
rest, the ratio of doubtful loans within a given industry should be orthogonal to historical exposure.  

17 This effect is computed as  σ ߚሺܭ௜ െ ܭഥሻݓ௜௜  , where ȕ is the elasticity of lending growth to capital growth,  ሺܭ௜ െ ܭഥሻ is the 
gap between current capital and the benchmark level and ݓ௜ is the weight of bank i in total business lending. 
2008: 4 staying at the 2007: 4 level. e :Q  l l.  
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Using balance sheet data of 2009:Q1 (the last period for which we have NPL ratio disaggregated 
by industry) we run the following set of industry-specific regressions: 
οܰܲܮ௜
௝ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅ ߜଵ
௝ ൫ܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻൯௜ ൅ ߜଶ
௝ሺܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ሻ௜οܪܴܲܫܥܧ௜ǡ௧ 
൅ߜଷοܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲǡ௧ ൅ ߜସοܪܴܲܫܥܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ σ ௦ߴܴܧܩܫܱ ௦ܰ௦ ൅ σ ߠ௩ܻܶܲܧ௩௩ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧ଶ     
If banks specialized in real estate lend to more collateral-dependent firms, we should expect ߜଵ
௝to 
be positive and ߜଶ
௝ to be negative at least for some industries. Rather than showing 23 industry-
specific regressions, we plot in Figure 5 an estimate of  ߜଵ
௝ ൅ ߜଶ
௝οܪܴܲܫܥܧ௜ǡ௧ where οܪܴܲܫܥܧ௜ǡ௧ is 
the 10th centile of the price change between 2005:Q1 and 2008:Q4 in our sample. In other words, 
we evaluate the impact of exposure on the NPL ratio in the provinces with highest price drops. We 
also show the 95% confidence interval around the value. 
The pattern of responses of the share of doubtful loans to historical exposition to real estate 
development interacted with housing prices in Figure 5 suggests that, for all industries but real 
estate development, there were small differences in the quality of borrowers across “real estate 
banks” and the rest. Excluding the trade sector (where estimates are still zero, but imprecise), 
provinces that experienced the lowest price increases between 20050 and 200804 did not have 
a higher share of NPLs. We only find a higher share on doubtful loans in the real estate 
development sector for banks operating in those provinces where prices increased the least. Such 
evidence is at odds with the notion of differences in borrower’s quality driving our results.    
6.2.Does the definition of capital matter? 
Table 2 examines whether exposition to real estate developers diminishes Tier 1 Capital growth. 
Now, it is unclear what measure of capital growth is the most relevant one for bank’s behavior. 
Furthermore, as we mentioned above, the Spanish regulator requires banks to accumulate extra 
provisions during expansionary periods as a way of self-insuring against the risk of unrealized but 
latent losses when credit is expanded. The resulting buffer (arising from the so-called dynamic 
provisioning) are not included in Tier 1 Capital, but in Tier 2 Capital. Hence, we also explore the 
relationship between exposure to real estate development and its interaction with housing prices 
and capital growth using this broader measure of capital changes.  The results are shown in the 
first two columns of Table 5. They are quite similar to those in Table 2. The main result is that 
historical exposure to real estate significantly affects capital growth in 2009 but not in 2008. 
6.3.A capital drop vs other changes: deposit, liquidity growth and interest rate 
responses 
We are examining a crisis period, so the link between capital growth and business lending can 
partially capture the impact on lending of impacts other than capital growth, such as differential 
evolution of deposits growth. For example, disruptions in the functioning of the interbank market 
i the lo est di  not have price betwe n 20 50 and 20 804 increases 
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may lead less liquid banks, or banks less able to attract depositors to cut lending to firms. Such 
confounding factors are likely to bias the estimates in Table 4 if banks with heavier exposition to 
real estate development, or located in provinces with heavier price drops also experienced liquidity 
shortages or lower deposit growth. Table 5 presents the results of OLS equations of total deposit 
growth on exposure to real estate (column 3) and its interaction with local housing prices (column 
4). The results are somewhat unstable across specifications. In Table 5, column 3 the estimate is 
8.2 (standard error: 4.8). The estimate suggests that banks more exposed to real estate 
development increase faced higher deposit growth (albeit the link is statistically not very precise). 
Nevertheless, when we introduce the interaction between exposure and housing prices, the 
relationship changes sign. In view of the unstable relationship, we further included as a regressor 
one year lagged deposit growth in a model otherwise similar to that in column (8) of Table 4. The 
results (not shown) were unchanged, suggesting that the unstable relationship between deposit 
growth and lagged exposure to real estate does not bias the estimates.  
The last column of Table 5 examines how bank liquidity responds to exposure to real estate 
development. We proxy bank liquidity using balance-sheet information on the bank lendings 
position relative to other institutions in the  interbank market and to the European Central Bank. In 
particular, our measure of liquidity is the difference between how much assets the bank lends to 
the interbank and Central Bank (the balance amount of reverse repos held by the bank) and the 
liabilities (assets sold under repurchase agreements). The dependent variable is year-on-year 
growth in liquidity. The estimates in Table 5, column 5 suggest that exposure to real estate 
development is a weak predictor of the evolution of bank liquidity. 
Interest rate responses  An alternative explanation of the findings in Table 4 is due to a differential 
increase in interest rates across banks. Such interpretation would be at odds with the relevance of 
capital growth, a factor that operates through a quantity, not a price effect. To explore the issue we 
examine the behavior of interest rates during 2008 and 2009 using bank-level information on the 
amount of new loans originated quarterly as well as the interest rate charged by the bank on those 
operations. Lending institutions provide information on interest rates split by loan size (below and 
above 1 million euro) and maturity. Maturity is reported in three brackets: below 1 year (some 70% 
of total lending) between 1 and 5 years and above 5 years. Unfortunately, not all banks provide 
that information, so we use a selected sample of 45 institutions. Table A.1.shows the results of 
year-specific OLS regressions of interest rates on the same set of covariates as in Table 5. 
Columns 1 and 2 show the average interest rate (weighting the interest rate in each maturity-loan 
size cell for the share of total lending in that cell relative to total business lending by the bank). 
Columns 5 and 6 introduce a correction for the fact that the weights used in the first column 
change with real estate exposure during the recession –banks more exposed to real estate 
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development cut business lending in 2009.18 Panel B of Table 7 displays the predicted interest 
rates for different levels of lagged exposure to real estate. In column 1 of Table A.1., the coefficient 
of exposure to real estate development is positive but not statistically significant at usual 
confidence levels. The interaction of exposure to real estate development and the change in 
housing prices is negatively and statistically significant. Nevertheless, the magnitude seems small. 
The results in Panel B of Table 7 suggest that banks in the 10th centile of the (asset-weighted) 
distribution of real estate exposure would charge some 25 bp lower interest rate than.those in the 
90th centile.  Furthermore, interest rates charged during the first quarter of 2009 were 200 bp 
smaller than the interest rates charged in the same period of 2008. That is, for the whole sample 
interest rates fell while credit dropped. We doubt that the small gradient on interest rates can 
generate the differences in business lending we find in the data. 
6.4.The relationship between lagged exposure to real estate development and 
credit growth: different specifications. 
Firstly, we estimate the relationship both in 2009 and 2008 but excluding from the sample the two 
largest institutions in the Spanish market. The reason for this omission is that the capital level and 
lending of those banks can be determined by their international portfolio, so the inclusion in the 
sample may alter the link between exposure to real estate development and loan growth. The 
results are not altered by such exclusion (columns 1 and 2 in Table 6). 
Secondly, as the distribution of lending is rather skewed, with a few banks accounting for a large 
share of business lending, we ran weighted least squares models using as weights the lagged 
share of the bank’s lending to all industries. The WLS estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 are 
similar in absolute value to those we obtain when we do not weight bank-industry cells, but they 
are also less precise.  
Thirdly, in Table 4 we trimmed the data by dropping the top and bottom 2 percentiles of the 
unconditional distribution of credit growth in our sample. The choice was based on the need to get 
more efficient estimates. To gauge whether the trimming strategy is affecting our estimates, we ran 
quantile regression models on the whole sample. The results are shown in columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 6. While much less precise, these results are qualitatively similar to the trimmed OLS 
estimates, suggesting that trimming does not substantially bias the magnitude of the estimates.   
6.5.Did firms reshuffle their debt portfolios?  
Under some circumstances firms may overcome bank-specific credit supply problems by 
reshuffling their debt portfolios and borrowing less from stressed banks and more from 
unconstrained ones. Actually, using data from Spain between 2002 and 2007, Jimenez et al 

18 The correction amounts to computing average interest rate charged by each bank across the 6 cells using not the share 
of loans originated as a fraction of total lending in 2009 or 2008, but weighting by the share of each cell in total business 
lending in the pre-crisis period of 2006Q1. 
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(2010b) document that, prior to the recession, firms that borrowed in 2002 from banks with a 
lower ability to securitize overcame bank-specific liquidity problems by borrowing more from the 
rest of banks.  
If loan reshuffling is prevalent, a model like [6] would overstate the relevance of bank-specific 
variables. Even if total lending remained constant and banks with high capital levels merely 
increase their share of lending at the expense of banks with low capital, a model like [6] would yield 
negative estimates for ߚଵand ߚଶ. Jiménez et al. (2010b) propose to gauge the relevance of bank-
specific factors by running a modified version of [6] aggregated at the firm level. In our case, that 
strategy would amount to running the following regression: 
ο݈݋݃ܮ௧
௃ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ σ
οே௉௅೔ǡ೟
ே಻
௜ୀே಻
௜ୀଵ ൅ ܾଶ σ
ο௟௢௚௄೔ǡ೟
ே಻
௜ୀே಻
௜ୀଵ ൅ σ
ఌ೔ǡ೟
಻
ே಻
௜ୀே಻
௜ୀଵ     [7] 
where ο݈݋݃ܮ௧
௃ is loan growth at the firm level and the rest of the variables are industry-specific 
averages of the covariates of interest. If reshuffling was very important in the data, the 
coefficients in the industry level regression ܾଵand ܾଶ would be smaller in absolute value than 
those of the bank-industry level regresssion -ߚଵand ߚଶ respectively. The extreme case of firms 
being able to borrow regardless of the capital position of banks would lead to estimates of ܾଵand 
ܾଶ around zero. As a robustness check, we implement a model like [7] averaging bank 
conditions of banks that, at the beginning of period 2008:Q4, were lending to a particular 
industry. Given the limited number of industries (23, 22 excluding real estate development) we 
supplement the analysis with scatter data plots. 
We make some modifications to model [7]. First, rather than running IV regressions of loan growth 
on average non-performing loans and capital growth, we use OLS regressions of industry-level 
capital growth on the main instrument directly (exposure to real estate developers). Secondly, we 
compute the average exposure to real estate development at the industry level as follows: 
ܧሺܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻ሻ௝ ൌ ෍
ܧݔ݌ܴ݈݁ܽଽହିଽ଻௜ǡ௧
௝ܰ
ͳሺܮ௜௧ିଵ
௃
௜ୀேೕ
௜ୀଵ
൐ Ͳሻ 
That is, the independent variable is the average exposure to real estate developers among banks 
that at the beginning of 2009 were lending to the industry. 
Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of data where the Y axis shows credit growth at the industry level 
while the X axis shows to what extent industries were dependent on banks traditionally exposed 
to real estate development. The graph suggests a negative relationship between both variables 
in 2009:Q4: industries that, as a whole, were more dependent on banks with traditional expertise 
on lending to real estate developers in 1995-1997 experienced lower credit growth in 2009. 
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Whether or not we weight the data by the size of the industry does not affect the qualitative 
pattern by much. 
In Table 7, we compare results of OLS regressions ran at the bank-industry (columns 1 and 2) and 
at the industry level (3) on measures of bank’s exposure to real estate development and type of 
institution. In column (3) the dependence on real estate development is measured at the industry-
level dependence and the share of savings banks is also measured at that level. Indications of 
credit reshuffling across banks arise when the coefficient of bank-industry regressions is larger in 
absolute value than that at the industry level. The results clearly suggest the opposite: An increase 
of average exposure to “real estate banks” of 1 pp reduces credit growth by 10 pp (standard error: 
0.6). Contrary to the “reshuffling” hypothesis, the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 
10 percent confidence level and larger in absolute value than the bank-firm level estimate of -.77 or 
-.88 in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. We infer that while obtaining credit from alternative borrowers 
can be an option during an expansion (as findings in Jimenez et al, 2010b suggest), a recession 
period offers very limited possibilities of switching to other loan suppliers.  
6.6.Possible sources of biases. 
Endogeneity of local housing prices. It can be argued that (one-year lagged) housing prices at the 
province level are determined by bank’s past borrowing and reflect the evolution of demand, rather 
than supply factors. While we make no adjustment for such source of bias, we note that housing 
prices are not used as an instrument throughout the analysis, but its interaction with 13 year-
lagged exposure to real estate development. In other words, as wide region dummies and housing 
prices are included as additional regressors, we end up comparing differences in credit growth of 
banks located in similar regions and similar price drops but that vary in terms of their initial 
exposure to real estate development 12 years prior to 2008.   
In addition, and to further examine if the housing price is really picking up demand factors, we 
re-did the analysis substituting housing prices by the provincial unemployment rate. As 
unemployment rate increased mainly in the construction sector between 2008 and 2009, it is to 
be related to regional demand factors associated to the construction boom. Unlike the 
interaction of lagged exposure to real estate development and housing prices, the interaction of 
lagged exposure with unemployment explains a very limited fraction of the variance of capital 
growth, dudosity or business lending growth (not shown). Hence, we interpret that the 
interaction of housing prices and real estate development in our specification picks up balance 
sheet effects that differ from demand factors.  
Unobserved demand conditions A major concern with the link between capital growth and 
business lending is the ability to control for the quality of firms demanding loans. For example, 
Jimenez et al (2010a) use matched firm-bank data to estimate the impact of monetary conditions 
on the lending behavior of less capitalized banks during the 2002-2008 period. The evidence we 
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find seems to counter the possibility of exposure to real estate being strongly related to 
demand factors: the timing of dudosity in Figure 2 does not suggest a differential trend prior to 
2008. Figure 5 does not give us many reasons to think that banks relatively more exposed to real 
estate development have worse borrowers when lending to the same industry as of 2009. Third, 
controlling for lagged dudosity in Table 4 does not seem to change our results. At any rate, if a 
deterioration of the quality of borrowers is driving our results, it must be a drop in the demand of 
credit that (a) is correlated with local housing prices only among borrowers from banks exposed to 
real estate development and that (b) cannot be detected in higher NPLs in sectors other than real 
estate development.  
7. Conclusions 
Bank credit to the non-financial private sector in the Spanish economy has experienced a sharp 
deceleration, from annual growth rates well above 20% in 2007 to negative figures registered at 
the trough of this cycle. The assessment of the relative contributions of demand and supply-side 
factors faces two main obstacles: the qualitative nature of the information sources explicitly 
distinguishing between both components and the simultaneity in their movements driven by the 
cyclical position of the economy and other factors. 
This paper explores one specific supply channel that has been potentially relevant to explain recent 
lending developments. More precisely, we analyze whether banks’ actual and expected capital 
growth influences loan supply to a given industry. We argue that the deleveraging process that is 
taking place in the banking system (driven both by expectations of higher regulatory capital 
requirements and by larger demands from financial markets) in the case of some banks might have 
not been enough to meet the increase in capital requirements. This is likely to be the case for those 
institutions with limited access to market funding, either because of institutional limitations or as a 
consequence of higher perceived risk (as might be the case, for instance, of banks with a high 
exposure to real estate sector). These institutions might have been able to rise own funds only by 
retaining profits and, in this period of declining profitability, this might have been insufficient to 
reach the desired level of capital. Under these circumstances, these banks might have had to cut 
back their lending.  
Using financial statements for a sample of Spanish banks, we have estimated different 
specifications for the separate impact of changes in banks’ actual and expected capital growth on 
bank lending. We have used an instrumental variable approach as well as industry fixed-effects to 
control for the simultaneity of supply and demand factors. We show that the historical exposure to 
real estate development is a good instrument for banks’ actual capital growth and that lagged 
exposure and its interaction with local housing prices affects the share of NPLs and, hence, future 
capital growth. Overall, we find that banks’ actual capital growth has been a relevant factor to 
explain lending supply, at least in 2009. Our interpretation is that banks that have experienced 
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capital shortfalls or banks that have increased their capital but without reaching the level that is 
demanded by financial markets might have had no option but to reduce their lending.  
The assessment of the magnitude of the effect is necessarily tentative as different assumptions are 
needed and different approaches lead to a wide range of estimates for this magnitude. In 
particular, we find that the contraction in lending stemming from the deterioration in banks’ capital 
position associated to the fall in housing prices accounts for between 6 and 25% of the observed 
decline in lending growth in 2009. In our view, the relatively small magnitude of this effect is 
explained by the weakness of loan demand in a context of a deep recession. However, as loan 
demand reacts to the economic recovery, the capital position of particular institutions might 
become more binding and this channel might gain in strength. Future work could then examine if 
the more recent evolution of housing prices and its interaction with bank’s specialization pattern 
affects either the supply of credit or other outcomes, such as employment levels.  
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Appendix  
The model is adapted from Van den Heuvel (2002). An infinitely-lived bank maximizes the expected 
stream of dividends ݀௧. The bank borrows at an interest rate ݎ௧ and keeps a level of capital ܭ௧. The 
bank uses those funds to lend an amount ௧ܰ to firms obtaining a return ܴሺ ௧ܰሻ per unit lent. We 
assume that the returns ܴሺܮ௧ሻ are a decreasing with L. The level of bank’s capital can be increased 
by retaining pos-tax profits ሺͳ െ ߬ሻߨ௧ାଵ and it diminishes when the bank pays dividends.  
We assume that the level of capital must exceed a minimum legal amount that is a fraction of the 
bank’s total amount lent ߛ௅ܮ௧ plus an amount required by the markets or arising from 
precautionary motives.
݉ܽݔௗǡே෍
ͳ
ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻ௧
݀௧
ஶ
௧ୀ଴

ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ܭ௧ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߬ሻߨ௧ାଵ െ ݀௧
ߨ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴሺܮ௧ሻ െ ݎ௧ሺܮ௧ ൅ ݀௧ െ ܭ௧ሻ
ܭ௧ െ ݀௧ ൒ ሺߛ௅ ൅ ߛ௎ሻ ௧ܰ
݀௧ ൒ Ͳ
The value function can be written as 
ܸሺܭ௧ሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔௗǡ௅ሼ݀௧ ൅
ͳ
ͳ ൅ ݎ௧
ܸሺܭ௧ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߬ሻߨ௧ାଵ െ ݀௧ሻ
s.t.ܭ௧ െ ݀௧ ൒ ሺߛ௅ ൅ ߛ௎ሻܮ௧ሺ߮௧ሻ
݀௧ ൒ Ͳ(ߠ௧ሻ
And the first order conditions are the following 
߲ߴ௧
߲݀௧
ൌ ͳ െ
ͳ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߬ሻݎ௧
ͳ ൅ ݎ௧
߲ ௧ܸାଵ
߲ܭ௧ାଵ
െ ߮௧ ൅ ߠ௧ ൌ Ͳ
߲ߴ௧
߲ܮ௧
ൌ
ሺͳ െ ߬ሻ
ͳ ൅ ݎ௧
߲ ௧ܸାଵ
߲ܭ௧ାଵ
ሾܴሺ ௧ܰሻ െ ݎ௧ሿ െ ߮௧ሺߛ௅ ൅ ߛ௎ሻ ൌ Ͳ
Where ߴis the Lagrangian of the constrained maximization problem and ܸ is the value function. 
The first condition says that the dividend policy must be such that the benefit of distributing one 
additional euro must equal the associated cost: less capital accumulated for next period and less 
funds available for lending, on top of the cost when the regulatory constraint binds ߮௧ or the 
financial constraint that no additional capital can be raised (ߠ௧ሻǤ 
The second condition shows that banks must lend until the return of the last euro invested equals 
its cost, both in terms of the cost of funding  ݎ௧ and the cost in terms of the capital requirement. 
Finally, the envelope theorem condition is the following: 
߲ ௧ܸ
߲ܭ௧
ൌ
ͳ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߬ሻݎ௧
ͳ ൅ ݎ௧
߲ ௧ܸାଵ
߲ܭ௧ାଵ
െ ߮௧
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1206
We start by examining the case when the financial constraint does not bind - or ߠ௧ ൌ Ͳ. In that 
case, combining the envelope condition and the first order condition for the dividend policy, one 
obtains that డ௏೟
డ௄೟
ൌ ͳ, which in turn implies that 
߮௧ ൌ
߬ݎ௧
ሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ
ሺܣǤ ͳǤ ሻ
And the lending policy is: 
ܯܴሺܮ௧ሻ ൌ ݎ௧ െ
߬ݎ௧
ሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ
ሺߛ௅ ൅ ߛ௎ሻሺܣǤ ʹǤ ሻ
We denote ܮ௧כas the amount of lending that solves (A.2). Importantly, the lending policy is 
determined by the marginal cost of funds, that combines the cost of raising funds and the cost of 
the regulatory constraint. The amount of lending does not depend on the capital position of the 
bank. If ߬ ൌ Ͳ, the regulatory constraint does not even enter the decision of how much to lend. 
It can be shown that in this setting, the regulatory constraint always binds, as carrying excess 
capital is suboptimal under perfect certainty. We assume that there is an initial distribution of values 
ߛ௎଴. Assume that either because capital markets require higher capital levels or because higher 
losses due a change in the expectations about housing prices, the capital level of the bank falls 
short of the new amount needed, i.e., for all banks such that  
ܭ௧ ൅ ݀௧ ൌ ሺߛ௎଴ ൅ ߛ௅ሻܮ௧כ ൏  ሺߛ௎ଵ ൅ ߛ௅ሻܮ௧כ  
Hence, in the new regime, ܮݐ
כ is not sustainable. In such setting, the only feasible level of borrowing 
is  
ܮ௧ ൌ
ܭ௧
ߛ௎ଵ ൅ ߛ௅
 
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Economic Research Working Paper number 16967. 
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Figure 1: The relationship between the weight of real estate development in 1995-1997 and the exposure in 2007Q4
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Figure 2: The impact of exposure to real estate development on Tier 1 capital growth, by year
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Each dot is the OLS response of Tier 1 capital growth to historical exposure to real estate development for each 
year between 2004 and 2009 Point estimates are obtained from year-specifi c OLS regressions of Tier 1 capital 
growth on historical exposure to real estate development (1995-1997), 9 region dummies, a dummy for savings 
bank and log of bank assets as of 1995. The dashed lines are the limits of the 95th confi dence interval.
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Figure 3: The impact of exposure to real estate development on y-o-y growth in business lending, by year
Each dot is the response of credit growth to historical exposure to real estate development for each year 
between 2004 and 2009 Point estimates are obtained from year-specifi c OLS regressions of credit growth 
to a specifi c industry on historical exposure to real estate development, 9 region and 23 industry dummies 
and a dummy for savings bank. The dashed lines are the limits of the 95th confi dence interval.
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Figure 4: The impact of exposure to real estate development on the growth rate of the NPL ratio, by year 
Each dot is the predicted level of dudosity evaluated at the median exposure to real estate development 
and the 10th centile of the distribution of bank specifi c change of housing prices between 2005Q1 and the 
year previous to the regression. We run the following yearly regression for all years between 2005Q4 and 
2009Q4
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Figure 5: The impact on the NPL ratio of real estate exposure to real estate development in 1995-1997 
interacted with an price drop  of 10 percent between 2006Q1 and 2008Q4.
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Each dot is the predicted level of dudosity evaluated at the median exposure to real estate development and the 
10th centile of the distribution of bank pecifi c change of housing prices between 2005Q1 and the year previous 
to the regression 
Point estimates are predicted values from 23 industry-specifi c OLS regressions of industry-specifi c share of 
NPLs on historical exposure to real estate development, the growth between 2006Q1 and 2008Q4 of provincial 
housing prices, region dummies and a dummy for savings bank. Dashed lines are the limits of the 95th confi dence 
interval
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Figure 6: Credit growth in 2009 and average exposure to real estate development by industry
The variable in the X axis is an average of exposure to real estate in 1995-1997 across all banks
that lent to the industry in 2008Q4. The Y-axis contains yearly credit growth at the industry level in 2009Q4. 
The solid line are the fi tted values of a regression of credit growth to an industry on the share of 
savings banks lending to that industry and the average exposure to real estate development among banks 
in the industry.
The coeffi cient of exposure to real estate development is -.10 (.06), shown in Table 7
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the sample of bank-industries as of 2009:Q4
Mean 
(std. Dev) Above median Below median T-test
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)=0
Tier 1 capital -asset ratio in 2009Q4 .0956 .0974 .095 2.23
(.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Share of doubtful loans 2009Q4 4.45 5.02 4.46 6.53
(1.58) (1.76) (1.36)
Nominal growth in business lending in 2009 -.0392 -.062 -.0195
(.430) (.366) (.50)
Mean growth business lending 2002-2006 .1419 .1408 .1655
(.583) (0.572) (0.566)
Savings bank .59 .62 .359 9.81
(.49) (.480) (.480)
Exposition to real estate development (2007Q4) .2783 .381 .199 21.78
(.177) (.106) (.181)
∆  housing prices 5Q1-06Q4 .178 .177 .179
∆  housing prices 5Q1-07Q4 .2309 .228 .2342
∆  housing prices 5Q1-08Q4 .1907 .187 .194
Characteristics in 1995-1997 (1)
Exposure to real estate development (1995-1997) .022 .034 .007 30.37
(.023) (.024) (.002)
Asset size 1995-1997 2.256 2.29 2.69
 (medians, unweighted) (7.290) (5.27) (9.14)
Tier 1 capital -asset ratio .13 .119 .146
(1995-1997 average) (.060) (.065) (.050)
Business dudosity ratio in 1998 .0128 .014 .0128 3.35
(.006) (.007) (.006)
Number of (bank-industry) cases: 1325 732 593
The unit of analysis is the combination bank-industry, where we have 68 banks and 23 industries for 2009Q4.
(1) Statistics weighted by bank's lending to firms in 1995-1997 (but asset size). Asset size measured in million euros
Exposure to real estate development 95-97
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A
41
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 1206
Table 2: The exposure to real estate in 1995-1997 and the growth of Tier 1 capital in 2009Q4: OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Exposure to real estate -1.042 -1.791 -1.518 -1.498
development (1995-1997) (.366)*** (.478)** (.558)** (.53)**
2. Exposure to real estate -- 3.375 2.354 2.079
* (∆ housing prices) (1.974) (2.24) (2.154)
3. Savings bank -.089 -.0922 -.09 -.0904
(.032) (.031) (.032) (.031)
4. ∆ Housing prices -- -.4764 -.442 -.359
 (06Q1-08Q4) (.240) (.238) (.255)
Bank characteristics as of 1995-1997
5. Asset size, 1995-1997 .002 .002
(.001) (.0012)
6. Log Tier 1 capital-asset ratio -.007 -.007
(.024) (.024)
7. Log dudosity (as of 1998) .026
(.0212)
8. Constant .189 .272 .22 .317
(.023) (.048) (.067) (.101)
Number of banks: 55 55 55 55
R-squared .45 .49 .49 .504
F-test (H0: Exposure=0) 8.12 14.06 7.40 7.90
1. Each observation belongs to a "consolidated group presenting balances both in 2008Q4 and 2009Q4
2. Housing price (unemployment): weighted average of the growth of the housing price (unemployment rate) between 2008Q4 
and 2006Q1 in the province where the main bank of the group is present, weighted by the number of branches in that province in 2006Q1
3. All specifications include 9 region dummies, indicating the region where the bank has most branches. The regions are Andalucia (including
2 autonomous cities), Balearic Islands, Canary Islands,  Castile (both regions), a joint dummy for Catalonia and Aragon, another joint dummy for 
Valencia and Murcia, abother for Galicia, Cantabria and Asturias, a joint dummy for Basque country and Navarre. The omitted region is Madrid
4. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***,**,* over the standard error imply that the coefficient is
significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence level.
Growth of Tier 1 capital (log difference between 2009.12 and 2008.12)
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Table 3: The exposure to real estate in 1995-1997 and the doubtful loans ratio in 2009Q4 and 2008Q4
Panel A: Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Exposure to real estate .114 .392 .3829 .375 .307
development (1995-1997) (.083) (.095)** (.096)** (.083)** (.12)**
2. Exposure to real estate -- -1.933 -1.882 -1.762 -1.596
* (∆ housing prices 06Q1-08Q4) (.450)** (.447)** (.351)** (.652)**
3. Savings bank .0019 -.0013 -.0018 -.003 -.007
(.003) (.002) (.002) (.0017) (.0018)
4. ∆ Housing prices 06Q1-08Q4 .0258 .126 .113 .124 .105
(.042) (.035) (.036) (.042) (.046)
5. Asset size, 1995-1997 2e-5 5e-5 6e-5
(.0001) (.0001) (5e-5)
6. Capital-asset ratio in 1995-1997 -- -- -.0045 -.0054 .0009
(.0017) (.0024) (.0024)
7. Log dudosity (as of 1998) -- -- -- .0005 .0009
(.0009) (.0007)
8. Constant .0064 -.0041 -.0025 -.013 .007
(.008) (.009) (.009) (.013) (.013)
Number of banks: 67 67 67 67 67
R-squared .24 .537 .542 .58 .538
F-test (H0: Exposure=Exposure*Price change=0) 1.13 9.22 8.86 14.54 7.99
Panel B: Dependent variable:
9. Exposure to real estate development .00034 .1218 .17 .193 .458
(1995-1997) (.027) (.073)* (.067)** (.054)*** ( .223)***
10. Exposure to real estate -- -.585 -.745 -.857 -2.105
* (∆ housing prices 06Q1-07Q4) (.292)** (.28) (.294)** (1.072)**
Number of banks: 68 68 68 68 68
R-squared .202 .268 .244 .294 .362
F-test (H0: Exposure=Exposure*Price change=0) 2.39 3.55 6.63 2.1
Columns (1)-(4) show OLS regressions of bank-specific growth of the share of dubious loans. Column (5) shows WLS (asset size in 1995-97 are the weights)
∆  Non-performing loans 2009Q4/Outstanding credit 2009Q4
∆  Non-performing loans 2008Q4/Outstanding credit 2008Q4
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Table 4: The impact of the doubtful loans ratio and capital growth on business credit growth in 2009
Estimation method: OLS TSLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. ∆ doubtful loans ratio in 2009 1.601 -.69 -.90 -1.34 -1.34 -1.44 -1.973 -1.96
(.553)** (1.884) (1.57) (1.73) (1.81) (1.50) (1.38) (1.51)
2. ∆ log(Capital tier 1) .0047 .707 .733 .796 .638 .601 .698 .61
2009Q4 vs 2008Q4 (.180) (.236)** (.247)** (.279)** (.309)** (.246)** (.230)** (.277)**
3. ∆ Housing prices -.5302 -.533 -.487 -.32 -.31 -.295 -.215
06Q1-08Q4 (.35) (.35) (.365) (.35) (.308) (.324) (.300)
Savings bank -.0299 .015 -.015 .018 .002 -.014 -.006 -.003
(.034) (.036) (.036) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.038) (.036)
Total lending 95-97 -.003 -.0024 -- -- -.002
(million euro) (.0018) (.0018) (.002)
log Capital -asset ratio 1995-1997 .002 -.0315 -- -- -.004
(.0035) (.0378) (.034)
log dudosity 1995-1997 -.019 -.0004
(.025) (.022)
Constant -.088 -.007 -.055 -.025 -.177 -.0106 -.0296 -.026
(.081) (.094 (.097) (.097) (.16) (.080) (.150) (.149)
F-test all instruments in ∆ doubtful loans ratio=0: 8.18 8.36 14.12 14.5 8.18 8.36 14.12
F-test all instruments in ∆ capital =0: 7.57 5.88 7.3 7.9 7.57 5.88 3.88
Industry dummies? Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1415 1357 1357 1357 1357 1033 1033 1033
Each column shows OLS and TSLS coefficients of a regression of credit growth of each of the 65 banks to each of the 23 industries in the sample 
on the bank's doubtful loans ratio and capital growth over the same period. The First stage of capital growth in Table 2 and that of doubtful loans ratio 
growth in Table 3.
1. Bank-industry cells where credit to business increased by more than the 98th centile or less than the 2th centile are excluded
2. Capital growth and doubtful loans ratio growth instrumented both with share of real estate development in total business lending between 1995 and 1997
instrumented with the interaction between real estate development and provincial growth in housing prices between 2006Q1 and 2008Q4
3. Standard errors corrected for generated regressors, heteroscedasticity and arbitrary correlation between observations from the same bank
Excluding industries related to real-estate
TSLS
Including industries related to real-estate 
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Table 5: The exposure to real estate in 1995-1997 and various bank-level outcomes in 2009Q4 and 2008Q4
Dependent variable: Deposits over total assets -growth Change in liquidity
2008:Q4-2009:Q4 2007:Q4-2008:Q4  2008Q4-2009:Q4 2008Q4: 2009Q4
(1) (2) (4) (5)
1. Exposure to real estate -1.619 -.9268 -1.142 -.084
development (1995-1997) (.671)** (1.029) (.596)* (.0944)
2. Exposure to real estate 5.77 3.79 5.461 .244
* (∆ housing prices 06Q1-08Q4) (3.023)* (4.00) (3.400) (.629)
3. Savings bank -.026 -.011 -.049 -.0213
(.034) (.033) (.024)** (.001)**
4. ∆ housing prices 06Q1-08Q4 -.144 .53 .026 .0006
(.319) (.38) (.28) (.098)
5. Asset size, 1995-1997 .0004 0 .001 .0007
(.0015) (.03) (.001) (.00047)
6. Capital-asset ratio -.004 -.044 .038 -.0071
in 1995-1997 (.025) (.037) (.033) (.005)
7. Log dudosity (as of 1998) .040 .047 .002 .0046
(.032) (.025) (.027) (.0018)
8. Constant .3204 .089 .087 .0339
(.13) (.125) (.12) (.024)
Number of observations 55 55 55 55
R-squared .257 .40 .31 .293
1. Each observation belongs to a "consolidated group presenting balances both in 2008Q4 and 2009Q4
2. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares. 9 Region dummies included in all specifications -see notes to Table 2.
3. Total asset size as of 1995-1997 is measured in million euros.
4. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***,**,* over the standard error imply that the coefficient is
significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence level.
5. Change in liquidity proxied as the change between 2009Q1 and 2008Q1 of the difference between the amount of reverse repos held and 
the amount of assets sold under repurchase agreements.
Tier 2 - Capital growth
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Table 6: The relationship between credit growth and exposure to real estate development in 1995-1997: specification checks
Estimation method: 
Dependent variable: log(Cred 09Q4) log(Cred 08Q4) log(Cred 09Q4) log(Cred 08Q4) log(Cred09Q4) log(Cred 08Q4)
-log(Cred 08Q4) -log(Cred 07Q4) -log(Cred 08Q4) -log(Cred 07Q4) -log(Cred08Q4) -log(Cred 07Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Exposure to real estate -.76 .10 -1.07 .678 -.13 -.28
development (1995-1997) (.26)** (.33) (.62)* (.55) (.39) (.22)
2. Exposure to real estate 4.55 11.9 4.71 18.5 9.74 8.46
* (∆ housing prices 06Q1-08Q4) (2.36)** (3.84)** (5.31) (10.9)* (8.760) (13.253)
3. Savings bank -.052 .04 -.033 .077 -.059 .0146
(.032)* (.41) (.027) (0.036) (0.036) (0.042)
4. ∆ housing prices 06Q1-08Q4 -.496 .739 -.52 .71 -1.202 -.1556
(.34) (.58) (.38) (.83) (.513) (.732)
5. Constant .042 .31 -.035 .176 .2307 .0881
(.15) (.18) (.13) (.210) (.110) (.150)
Number of cases 997 1011 1033 1046 1086 1100
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared .13 .11 .21 .07
OLS -excluding largest two banks WLS Median 
Each column shows OLS (columns 1 and 2), WLS (columns 3 and 4) and Quantile Regression models (columns 5 and 6) estimates of the impact on bank-industry 
credit growth of exposure to real estate development between 1995 and 1997 and its interaction with local housing prices growth between 2005 and the previous 
year. Housing prices is the deviation from  .20 (housing growth beween 2005 and 2007). The QR model is run on the full (non-trimmed) sample of business 
lending from each bank to each industry. In the WLS models, the weights used are total lending. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at 
the level of the bank
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Table 7: Did firms reshuffle their debt portfolios?
Bank-industry level regression Bank-industry level regression Industry-level regression
OLS OLS OLS
log(Cred09Q4)-log(Cred08Q4) log(Cred09Q4)-log(Cred08Q4) log(Cred09Q4)-log(Cred08Q4)
(1) (2) (3)
1. Exposure to real estate development -.777 -.882
in 1995-1997 (.297)** (.308)**
1a. Mean exposure to real -10.25
estate development (industry average) (6.501)*
2. Savings bank -.071 -.071
(.032)** (.032)**
2a. Mean of savings bank lending to the industry -.088
(industry average) (.015)**
3. Constant .0428 .0154 .834
(.026) (.034) (.233)
Sample size 1062 1062 22
Industry fixed-effects? No Yes No
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TableA.1.: The exposure to real estate in 1995-1997 and interest rates on new loans to firms: 2009Q1 and 2008Q1
Dependent variable:
2009:Q1 2008:Q1 2009:Q1  2008Q1 2009Q1 2008Q1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Exposure to real estate 4.64 -3.13 3.87 8.34 7.26 -1.17
development (1995-1997) (4.25) (4.25) (2.03)* (6.87) (4.21)* (4.92)
2. Exposure to real estate -128 92 -24 -37 -150 -17
* (∆ housing prices 06Q1-08Q4) (64)** (89) (16) (36) (73)* (96.3)
3. Savings bank -.02 -.075 -.096 -.16 -.17 .176
(.37) (.25) (.062) (.06)** (.36) (.233)
4. ∆ housing prices 06Q1-08Q4 14.17 8.41 .20 -.74 11.75 7.01
(3.26) (3.20) (.93) (.85) (3.18) (.23)
8. Constant 3.90 5.71  .45 .64 4.09 5.84
(.36) (.25) (.19) (.189) (.40) (.244)
Number of observations 45 45 45 45 45 45
R-squared .53 .39 .58 .37 .498 .35
Panel B: Predicted interest rate
1. At the 10th centile exposure (0.7%) 3.79 5.78 3.925 5.86
(.35) (.22) (.37) (.22)
2. At the average exposure and housing 3.90 5.71 4.09 5.83
price (.36) (.25) (.40) (.24)
2. At exposure evaluated at 90th 4.05 5.61 4.324 5.80
centile (3.3%) (.54) (.34) (.475) (.34)
1. Each observation belongs to a lending institution. Exposure to real estate (housing prices) are the deviation from sample (sample-year) average
2. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares. 9 Region dummies included in all specifications -see notes to Table 2.
3. The unadjusted interest rate is the weighted average by maturity (3 leves: below 1 year, between 1 and 5 and over 5 years) and loan size 
(below and above 1 million euro). The adjusted interest rate keeps constant the contribution of the weights in their 2006:Q1 levels.
4. Total asset size in 1995-1997, the capital asset ratio and the log of dudosity included in all specifications but not shown
Interest rate -unadjusted Share of loans below 1 million (1 year) Interest rate -adjusted
--
--
--
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